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1 Introduction
When an end-stage kidney patient has a willing, but incompatible living donor,
then in many countries this patient can exchange his/her donor for a compat-
ible one in a so-called kidney exchange programme (KEP). The first national
kidney exchange programme was established in 2004 in the Netherlands in
Europe [11]. Currently there are ten countries with operating programmes in
Europe [7], the largest being the UK programme [14].
Typically the matching runs are conducted every three months on pools
with around 50-300 patient-donor pairs. The so-called virtual compatibility
graph represents the patient-donor pairs with nodes and an arc represents a
possible donation between the corresponding donor and patient, that is found
compatible in a virtual crossmatch test. The exchange cycles are selected by
well-defined optimisation rules, that can vary across countries. The most im-
portant constraints are the upper limits on the length of exchange cycles, for
examples, two in France, three in the UK and Spain, and four in the Nether-
lands [7]. The main goal of the optimisation in Europe is to facilitate as many
transplants as possible, i.e. to maximise the number of nodes covered in the
compatibility graph by independent cycles. The corresponding computational
problem for cycle-length limits three or more is NP-hard, and the standard
solution technique used is integer programming [1].
International kidney exchanges have already started in Europe between
Austria and Czech Republic [8] since 2016, between Portugal, Spain and Italy
since summer 2018, and between Sweden, Norway and Denmark in the Scandi-
atransplant programme (STEP), built on the Swedish initiative [3]. The Italy-
Portugal-Spain collaboration is organised in a consecutive fashion, first the
national runs are conducted and then the international exchanges are sought
for the remaining patient-donor pairs. A related game-theoretical model has
been studied in [9]. In the Scandinavian programme and in the Prague-Wien
collaboration, the protocol is to find an overall optimum for the joint pool. In
the latter situation, the fairness of the solution for the countries involved can
be seen as an important requirement, which was studied in [13] with exten-
sive long-term simulations by proposing the usage of a compensation scheme
among the countries.
A similar situation arises in the US kidney exchange problem, where the
transplant centres are the strategic agents [5,6,4,17]. Most of the scientific
studies focus on the problem of incentivising the hospitals to register all of
their patient-donor pairs, and not only the hard-to-match ones, which often
happens in practice as the majority of transplants are still conducted within
transplant centres, outside of the three national schemes [2]. Novel suggestions
of credit based schemes have also been studied [12,2], and a similar system
has been implemented in the National Kidney Registry, which is the largest
in the volume of transplants among the three nationwide kidney exchange
programme in the US.
In this study we focus on the collaboration of countries and a key aspect
of this collaboration is the assumption that they all follow commonly agreed
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protocols. As such, there is no need to incentivise countries to register their
patient-donor pairs, unlike for the American hospitals. We will however com-
pare the consecutive and the joint pool scenarios in our simulations, as these
are both used in practice. We will not consider compensations, or any strategic
issues, but we will allow the countries to have different constraints and goals
with regard to the cycles and chains they may be involved in. In particular,
we will compare the benefits of the countries from international collaborations
when they have different upper bounds on their national cycles, and thus also
possible different constraints on the segments of the international cycles they
are participating in. As an example we mention the Austro-Czech cooper-
ation, where Austria requires to have all exchanges simultaneously, so they
allow short national cycles and short segments only, whilst in Czech Republic
longer non-simultaneous cycles and chains are also allowed. We formulate novel
IP models for dealing with potentially diverse constraints and goals in inter-
national kidney exchange programmes and we test two-country cooperation
scenarios under different assumptions over their constraints, the possibility of
having chains triggered by altruistic donors, and the sizes of their pools.
2 Model of international kidney exchanges
In a standard kidney exchange problem, we are given a directed compatibility
graph D(V,A), where the nodes V = {1, 2, . . . n} correspond to patient-donor
pairs and there is an arc (i, j) if the donor of pair i is compatible with the
patient of pair j. Furthermore we have a non-negative weight function w on
the arcs, where wi,j denotes the weight of arc (i, j), representing the value
of the transplantation. In most application the primary concern is to save as
many patients as possible, so the weight of each arc is simply equal to one.
We will also focus on this case in our simulations.
Let C denote the set of cycles allowed in D, which are typically allowed to
be of length at most K. The solution of a classical kidney exchange problem
is a set of disjoint cycles of C, i.e., a cycle-packing in D. For cycle c ∈ C, let
A(c) denote the set of arcs in c and V (c) denote the set of nodes covered by
c.1
In an international kidney exchange programme multiple countries (N)
are involved in the exchange, so the set of nodes is partitioned into V =
V 1 ∪ V 2 ∪ · · · ∪ V N , where V k is the set of patient-donor pairs in country k.
We have the following modifications of the classical problem. Let Ak denote
the arcs pointing to V k (so the donations to patients in country k). Note
that A = A1 ∪ A2 ∪ · · · ∪ AN . The weights of the arcs in Ak should reflect
1 In addition, we can also consider altruistic donors, in which case we separate the node
set into patient-donor pairs Vp and altruistic donors Va, so V = Vp ∪ Va. The solution
may contain exchange cycles and chains triggered by altruistic donors. The latter can be
conducted non-simultaneously, so different restrictions may apply for them. In this paper we
focus on cycles, but we note that one can reduce the problem of finding chains to the problem
of finding cycles by adding artificial patients to the altruistic donors, who are compatible
with all donors.
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the preferences of country k. (We may assume that these are scaled, e.g.,
by having the same average scores in order not to bias the overall optimal
solution towards some countries.) Finally, let AN and AI denote the national
and international donations, i.e., A = AN ∪AI .
In a global optimal solution, small cycles within the countries can have
different requirement than international cycles. Therefore we separate the two
sets of cycles into C = CN ∪ CI , where CN is the set of national cycles and CI
is the set of international cycles. We call the national parts of an international
cycle segments, where a segment is a path within a country, and the segments
are linked by international arcs. A l-segment is a path of length l− 1, with all
the l nodes belonging to the same country. Let S denote the set of all possible
segments, and let Sk denote the set of segments allowed in country k. For
s ∈ S, let A(s) denote the set of (national) arcs and let V (s) denote the set of
nodes covered (in the same country). Note that a segment may also consist of
a single node, which corresponds to the case when an international donation
is immediately followed by another international donation.
We can have the following natural restrictions on the national and inter-
national cycles.2 We may have upper limits on the
C1) total length of an international cycle
C2) length of national cycles for each country (possibly different)
C3) length of segments in international cycles for each country (possibly differ-
ent)
C4) number of segments in a country within an international cycle
C5) number of patient-donor pairs from a country in an international cycle
C6) number of countries involved in an international cycle
3 Integer programming formulations
First we describe the two classical IP formulations of Abraham et al. [1],
the edge-formulation and the cycle-formulation. We will build our general IP
solutions on these.
3.1 Basic edge-formulation
We introduce a binary variable yi,j for each arc (i, j). Finding a maximum
(value) solution with cycles of length at most K can be
max
∑
i,j
wi,jyi,j (1)
such that
2 In addition we can also have different constraints for altruistic chains, and we may
require that an international chain may have to end in the same country where it started.
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∑
i:(i,j)∈A
yi,j =
∑
k:(j,k)∈A
yj,k ∀j ∈ V (2)
∑
j:(i,j)∈A
yi,j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ V (3)
∑
(i,j)∈A(p)
yi,j ≤ K − 1 ∀p ∈ PK (4)
where PK denotes the set of K-length proper directed paths (i.e. which
are not cycles), and A(p) denotes the set of arcs in p.
3.2 Basic cycle-formulation
We introduce a binary variable xc for each cycle c ∈ C. The weight of a cycle
c is denoted by wc, which can be taken as the sum of the edge-weights in the
cycle, or can be defined differently.
max
∑
c∈C
wcxc (5)
such that ∑
c:i∈V (c),c∈C
xc ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ V (6)
One can use the cycle-formulation in our international setting after care-
fully searching and selecting the potential national and international cycles.
We used this technique to solve the two-country problems, described in the
last section. We defer the description of the cycle-search algorithm to
the Appendix.
3.3 Linking the cycle-, segment-, and edge-variables
When the pre-selection of international cycles is complicated then we can
use a mixed formulation, where the national cycles are represented by binary
variables, and the international cycles are decomposed into allowable segments.
We show how to link the cycle and segment variable with the edge variables,
and thus enforce various constraints for different countries. Let zs be a binary
variable of segment s ∈ S. Suppose that we only work with national cycles
CN with binary variables for all of them, but we do not have variable for
international cycles.
Besides the basic feasibility cycle-constraints (6) and edge-constraints (2),
we need the following sets of equations.
6 Pe´ter Biro´ et al.
∑
j:(i,j)∈A
yi,j ≤
∑
c:i∈V (c)
xc +
∑
s:i∈V (s)
zs ≤ 1,∀i ∈ V (7)
The above condition (7) enforces that we can only cover a node by either
a national cycle or by a segment.
|A(c)| · xc ≤
∑
(i,j)∈A(c)
yi,j ∀c ∈ CN (8)
∑
(i,j)∈A(c)
yi,j − |A(c)|+ 1 ≤ xc ∀c ∈ CN (9)
Conditions (8) and (9) imply the inclusion of all the edge-variables in a
national cycle if and only if that cycle is selected in the solution.
Let e+(i) =
∑
(j,i)∈AI yj,i and let e
−(i) =
∑
(i,j)∈AI yi,j two new indicator
variables showing whether node i is receiving or giving a kidney in an inter-
national exchange. We set the following condition for each segment s with
starting node u and terminal node v.
(|A(s)|+ 2) · zs ≤
∑
(i,j)∈A(s)
yi,j + e
+(u) + e−(v) ∀s ∈ S (10)
∑
(i,j)∈A(s)
yi,j + e
+(u) + e−(v)− |A(s)| − 1 ≤ zs ∀s ∈ S (11)
Conditions (10) and (11) imply the inclusion of all the edge-variables of a
segment if and only if that segment is selected as part of an international
cycle in the solution.
3.4 Satisfying the special constraints
Here we give possible solutions for enforcing the requirements with IP formu-
lations. As we noted, by a careful cycle-search algorithm we can always satisfy
all of the conditions as long as the short upper bounds on the lengths of cycles
exists. However, if a country allows unbounded length cycles or chains then we
shall use edge-variables as well, combined with cycle and segment-variables.
Furthermore, the usage of edge- and segment-variables can also be useful to
simplify the cycle-search algorithms and rule out the infeasible cycles by edge-
formulation constraints instead. Therefore, in the following description we ex-
plain how to use the variants of the previously provided edge-formulations for
achieving the required conditions.
C1) total length of an international cycle
In case we have only this requirement may use the basic edge-formulation to
satisfy this condition. However, if we also have restrictions on the national
cycles then we need an extended model that we will describe in the following
point.
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C2) length of national cycles for each country
Regarding the edge-formulations, we may already need a more sophisticated
formula, in case the international cycle would allow a longer segment in a
country than the maximum length of the national cycles in that country. For
this purpose, we can introduce two new edge variables for each arc (i, j), yˆi,j
and yˇi,j , where the former denotes whether this edge is used in a national
cycle and the latter denotes whether it is used in an international cycle. We
have yi,j = yˆi,j + yˇi,j , and for any arc in A
I we do not have yˆi,j , as this arc
cannot be involved in a national cycle. We also have to ensure consistency, so
condition (2) should be written up separately for national and international
edge-variables for each node as follows.∑
i∈V
yˆi,j =
∑
k∈V
yˆj,k ∀j ∈ V (12)
∑
i∈V
yˇi,j =
∑
k∈V
yˇj,k ∀j ∈ V (13)
The reason behind this separation is to allow different upper bounds on
the lengths of the national and international cycles. For instance, if the in-
ternational cycles have upper bound K and in the meantime country k have
upper bound Kk on the length of its national cycles then we can achieve both
by the following pair of conditions.∑
(i,j)∈A(p)
yˇi,j ≤ K − 1 ∀p ∈ PK in D (14)
∑
(i,j)∈A(p)
yˆi,j ≤ Kk − 1 ∀p ∈ PKk in Dk (15)
It is also important to note that after this separation we shall set the
constraints used for making the connections between the edge-, cycle- and
segment-variables accordingly. Namely, in the constraints for national cycles,
(8) and (9), we shall replace yi,j with yˆi,j , whilst in the constraints for seg-
ments, (10) and (11), we shall replace yi,j with yˇi,j .
C3) length of segments in international cycles for each country
To bound the length of national segments in international cycles, we can either
search the allowable segments and define segment variables for them, or we can
satisfy these constraints by using the international edge-variables. For instance
if Lk is the upper bound for the length of segments in country k then we need
the following modified edge-constraint.∑
(i,j)∈A(p)
yˇi,j ≤ Lk ∀p ∈ PLk in Dk (16)
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C4) number of segments in a country within an international cycle
Following the idea of [10] used for providing a compact formulation for the
basic problem, we propose to define layers in order to separate the international
cycles from each other. This will facilitate a simple way to set restrictions for
this and the final two points.
Suppose that we can have at most T international cycles in the solution
(e.g., T ≤ |V |/2). For every t ∈ [1 . . . T ] we define binary edge-variables
yti,j denoting whether that edge is included in the t-th cycle. We set yˇi,j =∑
t∈[1...T ] y
t
i,j . We replicate (2) for each layer, as follows.∑
i∈V
yti,j =
∑
k∈V
ytj,k ∀j ∈ V, t ∈ [1 . . . T ] (17)
Now, we can restrict the number of segments from the same country k to
be less than or equal to λk with the following conditions.∑
(i,j)∈AI∩Ak
yti,j ≤ λk ∀t ∈ [1 . . . T ] (18)
Note that the above formulation does not rule out the possibility of hav-
ing multiple international cycles in one layer, however, neither of them can
have more than λk segments in country k. Furthermore, if we want to enforce
that an international cycle can only have one segment from each country in
a two-country programme then we can simplify the constraints, as follows.
We can separate the layers according to the nodes from the first country that
has outgoing arcs to the second country. Let the t-th such node, i, have only
variables yti,j for outgoing international transplants, which means that this
node can only be involved in an international cycle at the t-th layer. See more
about this idea at the end of this Section, where we describe the implementa-
tion of the bounder-unbounded two-country case (i.e., Austria-Czech Republic
collaboration) in details.
C5) number of patient-donor pairs from a country in an international cycle
By using again the above defined layers, we can easily set restrictions on the
number of pairs involved in an international cycles from one country. If this
upper bound is βk for country k then we can enforce this condition with the
following constraints. ∑
(i,j)∈Ak
yti,j ≤ βk ∀t ∈ [1 . . . T ] (19)
C6) number of countries involved in an international cycle
To achieve this restriction with edge-variables, we shall define a new indica-
tor variable for each country-layer pair, which shows whether this country is
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involved in an international cycle in that layer. Thus, let us define a binary
variable btk for each country k and layer t, which must be one if this country
is involved in an international cycle at this layer. This can be achieved with
the following constraints.∑
(i,j)∈AI∩Ak
yti,j ≤ btk · |V k| ∀k ∈ [1 . . . n], t ∈ [1 . . . T ] (20)
This implies that if there is an ingoing international transplant to country
k at layer t then btk must be equal to one (but otherwise it can be zero). If the
number of countries allowed in an international cycle is γ then we can enforce
this condition with the following constraint.∑
k
btk ≤ γ ∀t ∈ [1 . . . T ] (21)
Adding altruistic chains
We already noted that if we add the possibility of having altruistic chains,
where their lengths is similarly bounded as the cycles then we can simply
treat them as cycles by adding a dummy arc to the imaginary patient of the
altruistic donor from all donors. However, the length restrictions are different
for the altruistic chains (which can be reasonable, since these can be conducted
non-simultaneously), in fact, they can even be considered unbounded (aka.
never ending chains [15]). In this case we shall introduce new edge-variables
corresponding to the possibility of conducting a transplant in an altruistic
chain. Furthermore, we may even separate them to variables for national and
international chains, if they have different restrictions.
An example: the case of Austria and Czech Republic
As an example, we describe the full IP-model for a problem setting that is rep-
resenting the cooperation between Austria and Czech Republic. Here Austria
allows only short national cycles and short segments, whilst Czech Republic
allows unbounded national cycles and unbounded segments in international
cycles, and we require that every international cycle has only one segment in
each country. This IP formulation was implemented and used in the simula-
tions for the two-country cases, that we described in Section 4.
Let V 1 denote the first country with bounded length cycles and segments
(Austria) and let V 2 denote the second country with unbounded length na-
tional cycles and segments (Czech Republic). We introduce cycle and segment
variables for V 1 (but not for V 2) and we introduce edge-variables for A2 and
AI (but not for the internal edges in V 1). Furthermore, we introduce layers
1 . . . T , such that T is the number of nodes in V 1 that has outgoing edge to V 2.
For all the edges with edge variables yi,j we introduce also the layer variables
yti,j for every t ∈ [1 . . . T ], except the edges from V 1 to V 2. For these edges we
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introduce only one layer variable, as follows. Let i be the t(i)-th node in V 1
that has outgoing edge to V 2. We introduce a binary variable y
t(i)
i,j for every
arc (i, j) ∈ AI , but these edges will not have other layer variables. This will
ensure that every international cycle has only one segment in each country.
Below we describe the complete IP formulation for this special setting.
max
∑
c∈C
|c|xc +
∑
(i,j)∈A
yi,j +
∑
s∈S
|s|zs
subject to:
∑
t∈[1...T ]
yti,j = yi,j ∀(i, j) ∈ A (22a)∑
i∈V
yti,j =
∑
k∈V
ytj,k ∀t ∈ [1 . . . T ], j ∈ V (22b)∑
j∈V
yi,j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ V (22c)∑
c:i∈V (c)
xc +
∑
s:i∈V (s)
zs ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ V 1 (22d)
∑
k∈V 2
yk,i =
∑
s:s=(i,... )
zs ∀i ∈ V 1 (22e)
∑
k∈V 2
yj,k =
∑
s:s=(...,j)
zs ∀i ∈ V 1 (22f)
∑
k∈V 2
y
t(j)
k,i +
∑
l∈V 2
y
t(j)
j,l ≥ 2zs ∀i, j ∈ V 1, s = (i, . . . , j) (22g)
4 Simulations
We conduct long-term simulations with agents arriving and leaving the pool
such as in [16], (e.g. with 3-months matching runs for 3 years). We restrict
our attention to maximising the size of the solutions, and do not consider
scoring methods or any other objective. We conduct the simulations for the
two-country case, as the effects of the cooperation for a country can already
be tested on this simple setting.
Cooperation policies:
We consider three basic policies for international cooperation:
a) no cooperation: each country conducts its matching run separately.
b) consecutive matching : each country conducts its national run first and then
the international run is conducted for the remaining pairs (as done in the
Spanish-Italian-Portuguese programme).
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c) merged pools: where the countries register all their pairs in a merged pool
and a global optimisation is conducted (e.g. Austria-Czech Republic and
Sweden-Norway-Denmark) while respecting local policy restrictions.
Differences between countries
Our main interest is to evaluate how the differences between the national pools
and the optimisation constraints effect the benefits of the countries involved
in the collaboration.
Patient availability constraints:
1. size of pools: size ratios being 1:1, 3:4, 1:2, 1:4.
Local policy constraints:
2. different upper bounds on the length of the national cycles: 2:2, 2:3, 2:4,
2:∞, 3:3, 3:4, 3:∞.
International policy constraints:
3. the size of the international cycles: it is set to be the larger individual cycle
bound.
4. the length of the segments in each country: it is set to one less than the
individual cycle bound
5. the number of segments in each country: it is unrestricted with the ex-
ception of the case of collaboration with a country with unbounded cycles
where we consider only one segment for each country per international
cycle.
In the summary tables we show how much each country is benefiting from
the cooperation, as compared to the baseline setting (no cooperation).
5 Case Study: Simulations involving two countries
To determine the benefits of international KEPs we conduct a case study in-
volving two countries which aim to develop a joint KEP and are concerned
Fig. 1 Graphical representation of solutions for the first KEP stage in one of the instances:
altruist donors are at the top, patient-donor pairs form circles for each country and arcs
represent transplants. Left side, individual KEPs: 13/16 patients receive transplants in the
small country, 28/38 patients in the large country are transplanted. Right side, merged KEP:
the numbers are 15/16 for the small country, and 32/38 for the large one.
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about the advantages and disadvantages of cooperation between their KEPs.
We compare the individual benefits from the no cooperation case to the con-
secutive matching and merged pool scenarios.
The simulation involves 20 instances each containing the compatibility in-
formation for 1000 patient-donor pairs. For the sake of simplicity, although
our model can handle altruist donors (who start chains), for the case study we
only consider the cyclic exchanges among incompatible patient-donor pairs.
The reason for this choice is to be able to more clearly see the difference in
cooperation (because adding chains may dramatically increase the number of
transplants in any given KEP stage). The length of the considered time-frame
for the simulated kidney exchange scenarios is 3 years with matching runs
scheduled every 3 months for each instance. Every agent is assigned an uni-
formly distributed arrival time to the KEP and the patient-donor pairs stay
in the KEP for a maximum of 1 year (or 4 matching runs) after which they
leave the programme (which means that they opt for an alternative solution,
such as having a direct ABO-incompatible transplant after desensitisation or
getting a deceased organ).
To understand the importance of the parameters of collaboration presented
in Section 4 we conduct a sensitivity analysis by considering most of the com-
binations possible. We illustrate the impact of both programme pool size and
local policy constraints on the cooperation of KEPs by:
1. examining the stage-by-stage amount of transplants and drop-out patients
of the programme in each country (see Figure 7).
2. examining the total number of transplants resulting after 3 years for each
participant country (see Figures 2-6).
Explanation of the figures and tables
In the first row of Figure 7 we consider a baseline scenario where two countries
have the same pool size (on average 41.6 patients arrive per stage or 500
during 3 years) and same constraints (local and international cycle bound 3,
no altruist donors).
Then, in the second row of Figure 7 we demonstrate the effects of local
KEP constraints on the matched pairs by only changing the local constraint
in country 2 (now has local cycle bound 2 and international cooperation can
be done with 2-cycles and 3-cycles with only one participant patient-donor
pair in country 2). Note that the patient compatibility and arrival time to the
programme was not modified.
In the third row of Figure 7, we show the impact of pool size on the number
of transplants by only removing half of the patients inside the pool of country
2 (they never register to the KEP). Note that the patient compatibility and
arrival time to the programme for the remaining patients was not modified.
Finally, the bottom row of Figure 7 shows the relative improvement in
the number of transplants defined as: the number of transplants obtainable
by merged KEP divided by the number of transplants that would have been
achieved by the respective country’s local KEP.
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In every scenario the objective is simply to maximise the number of trans-
plants. There are three settings for collaboration: no cooperation (i.e. separate
KEPs, baseline scenario), consecutive matchings (each country runs a local
KEP optimisation and then the remaining patient pools enter a joint KEP)
and full collaboration (a single KEP for both countries).
Figures 2-6 describe the improvement from merged KEP collaboration in
the number of transplants over the number of transplants each country can
achieve by themselves (we define this value as the benefit of collaboration).
These figures are a result of a sensitivity analysis experiment where the effects
of local country bounds and size limitations are explored. The information is
also displayed in numeric format in Tables 1 and 2. The listed values represent
the number of performed transplants (for each country) measured at the end
of the 3 year programme and the values are averages of 20 instances (each
instance runs for 12 KEP stages).
Experimental results discussion
Our testing reveals some expected and some unexpected results. The expected
results are the following:
1. On average, when countries collaborate, they do not lose out in terms of
total number of transplants after 3 years even without enforcing individual
rationality constraints.
2. The merged KEP generally shows much better improvement in the number
of transplants than the consecutive KEP for less restricted countries. The
consecutive KEP seems more significant (closer to the merged KEP results)
for more restricted cases (see 2:2 bound case in Table 1).
3. The size of the KEP pool is a significant factor and positively impacts all
forms of collaboration (see Figures 4-6 and row 3 in Figure 7 ).
4. When a smaller country (in terms of KEP pool size) collaborates with
a larger country, the smaller country sees greater benefit than the larger
country, while the larger country does not lose transplants over what they
can achieve by themselves.
Less expected results:
1. The local restrictions of participating countries have an interesting effect
on collaboration (see Figures 2, 3).
a. Countries with cycle bound 2 prefer less restricted partners.
b. Countries with other bounds prefer more restricted partners.
c. Partners with the same bounds would prefer that their partner had
a different bound than themselves. This unusual observation appears
consistently as a depression at surface coordinates (2,2), (3,3) and (4,4)
in Figures 2 and 3 and as a valley at bounds 2, 3, 4 in Figures 4, 5 and
6, respectively.
2. All things being equal, the partner with the larger KEP pool is preferred.
However, there is an exception to this “larger is better” rule: sometimes
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a smaller partner is preferred if they have more suitable restrictions than
an equally sized partner as can be seen in Figure 5: compare the height at
(bound, size) coordinates (2, 34 ) and (3,
4
4 ).
We give the following explanation for the anomalous results (especially case
1c): the strange behavior is a result of our chosen policy regarding interna-
tional transplants. Consider the following example. When countries (C1, C2)
have bounds (3, 2), respectively, the increase in the number of transplants for
country 1 relative to the (3, 3) bounds case is due to the under-utilisation of
the second country’s patient-donor pool, leading to a surplus that helps coun-
try 1. On the other hand, when (C1, C2) have bounds (3, 4), the increase in
the number of transplants relative to the (3, 3) bounds case is caused by the
policy that international cycles are of length up to 4 (with at most 2 PDPs
in country 1). This policy helps country 1 to secure more transplants for itself
since the international cycles are less restricted than the (3, 3) bounds case.
Fig. 2 C1 and C2 have same pool sizes
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Fig. 4 Country 1 has cycle bound 2, 100% pool size
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Fig. 5 Country 1 has cycle bound 3, 100% pool size
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Fig. 6 Country 1 has cycle bound 4, 100% pool size
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Fig. 7 Plots detailing the amount of transplants (solid line) and dropouts (dotted line)
during each stage of the KEP and separately for each country (country 1 on the left side
and country 2 on the right). The first three rows each containin two plots showcasing a
different scenario: (1:1 size, 3:3 bounds), (1:1 size, 3:2 bounds) and (2:1 size, 3:3 bounds),
respectively. The bottom row describes individual relative improvement merged transplants
local transplants
.
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Table 1 Number of transplants in each country (average of 20 instances). Same sized pools,
different policy constraints.
C1 C2 C1 C1 C1 C2 C2 C2
bound bound local seq. merged local seq. merged
2 2 301.90 343.65 352.45 297.80 338.65 351.85
2 3 301.90 325.15 380.90 408.40 429.95 456.20
2 4 301.90 315.05 390.10 433.90 445.10 473.30
2 ∞ 301.90 307.35 387.90 449.60 458.10 481.05
3 2 408.85 434.15 459.85 297.80 323.40 380.70
3 3 408.85 418.80 445.85 408.40 414.60 440.25
3 4 408.85 414.15 447.45 433.90 436.25 462.35
3 ∞ 408.85 410.15 442.75 449.60 450.80 473.30
4 2 433.75 447.85 479.20 297.80 310.65 383.05
4 3 433.75 438.25 464.35 408.40 411.65 446.05
4 4 433.75 436.00 458.45 433.90 433.85 455.05
4 ∞ 433.75 434.35 462.25 449.60 449.60 457.45
Table 2 Number of transplants in each country (average of 20 instances). Country 1 has
fixed pool size of 100% and cycle bound 3, Country 2 has varying pool size and varying
policy constraints.
C2 C2 C1 C1 C1 C2 C2 C2
bound size local seq. merged local seq. merged
2 1/4 408.85 425.35 425.25 39.6 60.35 95
2 2/4 408.85 431.85 439.7 110.6 135.55 187
2 3/4 408.85 432.6 449.4 202.5 228.1 284.55
2 4/4 408.85 434.15 459.85 297.8 323.4 380.7
3 1/4 408.85 422.1 422.5 63.3 77.7 102.1
3 2/4 408.85 420.5 433.6 167.9 179.05 207.85
3 3/4 408.85 419.6 440.8 289.2 298.55 325.55
3 4/4 408.85 418.8 445.85 408.4 414.6 440.25
4 1/4 408.85 421.3 423.45 72.1 85.55 109.25
4 2/4 408.85 417.7 435.35 186.65 195.6 223.15
4 3/4 408.85 415.6 442.2 312 316 345.1
4 4/4 408.85 414.15 447.45 433.9 436.25 462.35
∞ 1/4 408.85 419.6 422.5 79.25 86.75 108.8
∞ 2/4 408.85 414.9 433 203.35 205.2 226.9
∞ 3/4 408.85 411.7 440.45 328.95 330.55 351.3
∞ 4/4 408.85 410.15 442.75 449.6 450.8 473.3
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6 Conclusion
We studied the multi-country kidney exchange problem, where the participat-
ing countries may have different constraints and objectives on their national
cycles and chains and the parts of the international cycles and chains they are
involved in. We formulated IP-models to describe various reasonable condi-
tions by extending the classical cycle- and edge-formulation models with new
segment variables and with constraints linking the three types of variables.
These formulations are particularly useful if some participant country has no
bounds of the lengths of the cycles or altruistic chains.
In the simulation part we tested the two-country scenario focusing on the
dependence of the countries’ benefits on the sizes of their pools, and their
restrictions. The simulations are realistic with regard to the current practices
in Europe and can provide interesting consideration for the decision makers.
We briefly described the way that altruistic chains can be treated in this
framework, but in a more extensive study one could consider the particular
challenges and constraints related to them. In a potential follow up paper one
could also extend this study by considering also the quality of the transplants,
rather than only the number of transplants, which is the primary, but not the
only goal of the current kidney exchange programmes.
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Appendix
Hereby we describe the cycle-search algorithm used in our simulations. An
important fact is that there very little data dependency, meaning that the
code is highly parallelizable. In our implementation we simply parallelize by
the outermost for loop, distributing each i to a different worker thread and
then collect the results back to the main thread after each worker thread is
finished. We use Java and Java Threads for a simple and portable solution.
Algorithm CycleSearch(Set V ) adds cycle variables to the model that respect all the
constraints. The functions in bold are defined separately. Variable InternationalCycleLength
is assumed to be a globally available parameter.
1: for i← 1, |V | do
2: for j ← i+ 1, |V | do
3: if (i, j) ∈ A and (j, i) ∈ A then
4: if IsValidCycle((i, j)) then
5: add cycle (i, j) to model
6: if InternationalCycleLength < 3 then
7: continue
8: for k ← j + 1, |V | do
9: if (i, j) ∈ A and (j, k) ∈ A and (k, i) ∈ A then
10: if IsValidCycle((i, j, k)) then
11: add cycle (i, j, k) to model
12: if (i, k) ∈ A and (k, j) ∈ A and (j, i) ∈ A then
13: if IsValidCycle((i, k, j)) then
14: add cycle (i, k, j) to model
15: if InternationalCycleLength < 4 then
16: continue
17: for `← k + 1, |V | do
18: if (i, j) ∈ A and (j, k) ∈ A and (k, `) ∈ A and (`, i) ∈ A then
19: if IsValidCycle((i, j, k, `)) then
20: add cycle (i, j, k, `) to model
21: if (i, j) ∈ A and (j, `) ∈ A and (`, k) ∈ A and (k, i) ∈ A then
22: if IsValidCycle((i, j, `, k)) then
23: add cycle (i, j, `, k) to model
24: if (i, k) ∈ A and (k, j) ∈ A and (j, `) ∈ A and (`, i) ∈ A then
25: if IsValidCycle((i, k, j, `)) then
26: add cycle (i, k, j, `) to model
27: if (i, k) ∈ A and (k, `) ∈ A and (`, j) ∈ A and (j, i) ∈ A then
28: if IsValidCycle((i, k, `, j)) then
29: add cycle (i, k, `, j) to model
30: if (i, `) ∈ A and (`, j) ∈ A and (j, k) ∈ A and (k, i) ∈ A then
31: if IsValidCycle((i, `, j, k)) then
32: add cycle (i, `, j, k) to model
33: if (i, `) ∈ A and (`, k) ∈ A and (k, j) ∈ A and (j, i) ∈ A then
34: if IsValidCycle((i, `, k, j)) then
35: add cycle (i, `, k, j) to model
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Function IsValidCycle(Cycle c) returns Boolean: whether cycle variable must be added
to model. MaxCycleLengthcountry is a globally available parameter. The Country function
returns the country affiliation of the PDP. Other functions are defined separately.
1: if IsLocal(c) and |c| ≤ MaxCycleLengthCountry(c1) then
2: return true
3: else if CheckCountries(c) and CheckSeg(c) then
4: return true
5: return false
Function IsLocal(Cycle c) returns Boolean: whether Cycle c is not an international cycle.
The Country function returns the country affiliation of the PDP.
1: for i← 2, |c| do
2: if Country(c1) 6= Country(ci) then
3: return false
4: return true
Function CheckCountries(Cycle c) returns Boolean: whether the country constraints
are verified for Cycle c. Variables that are not initialized here are assumed to be globally
available parameters. The Country function returns the country affiliation of the PDP.
1: for country← 1,NumCountries do
2: Countcountry ← 0
3: for i← 1, |c| do
4: country← Country(ci)
5: Countcountry ← Countcountry + 1
6: if Countcountry > MaxCountcountry then
7: return false
8: participants← 0
9: for country← 1,NumCountries do
10: if Countcountry > 0 then
11: participants← participants + 1
12: if participants > MaxParticipantCountries then
13: return false
14: return true
22 Pe´ter Biro´ et al.
Function CheckSeg(Cycle c) returns Boolean: whether the segment constraints are veri-
fied for Cycle c. Variables that are not initialized here are assumed to be globally available
parameters. The Country function returns the country affiliation of the PDP.
1: for i← 1, |c| do
2: NodeList.append(ci)
3: NodeList.append(c1)
4: seglength← 0
5: for country← 1,NumCountries do
6: NumSegmentscountry ← 0
7: for i← 1, length(NodeList)− 1 do
8: source← NodeListi
9: target← NodeListi+1
10: if Country(source) = Country(target) then
11: seglength← seglength + 1
12: if seglength > MaxSegmentLengthCountry(target) then
13: return false
14: else
15: seglength← 0
16: NumSegmentsCountry(target) ← NumSegmentsCountry(target) + 1
17: if NumSegmentsCountry(target) > MaxSegmentsCountry(target) then
18: return false
